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2The Failure of Democracy in Turkey: A Comparative Analysis
Abstract
Although Turkey took its initial steps toward establishing democracy in 1950, it has thus
far failed to become a fully functioning democracy. Using the comparison cases of Spain
and Greece, this paper discusses two related variables that are likely to have thwarted the
development of full democracy in Turkey: (1) experience with authoritarian rule and (2)
elite settlement or convergence toward acceptance of the democratic rules of the game.
The paper ultimately contends that despite the EU’s attempt to push Turkey towards full
democracy in the modern day it is unlikely that Turkey will become a fully functioning
democracy until it manages to achieve civilian elite agreement regarding the rules of the
Turkish democratic game, and that Turkey’s experience with authoritarian rule may, in
turn, have hindered the development of such rules.
3In 1950 the Turkish Republic took its first real steps toward democracy by introducing
completely free elections and by the 1970s it was considered to be amongst the group of
Southern European regimes in transition to democracy, along with countries like Spain
and Greece. The Turkish Republic faced many similar circumstances to other South
European transitional regimes but unlike these has thus far failed to achieve full
democracy. This paper uses the comparison cases of Spain and Greece to address the
question of why Turkey has failed to become a fully functioning democratic regime.
‘Fully functioning democracy’ here includes fairly widely accepted criteria: free and fair
elections, freedom of speech and assembly, and respect for human rights. It also means
that key policymakers can be held accountable (via free and fair elections) and in
particular that unaccountable bodies such as militaries do not play a role in general
policymaking, other than to advise specifically on security-related issues.1 A ‘fully
functioning democracy’ also implies that there is very little uncertainty about the
likelihood that the democratic rules and norms, however established, will be maintained
(i.e., not overthrown).
Other than brief interruptions in 1960-61 and 1980-83, Turkey has, in fact, met
the most basic democratic requirement of holding free and fair elections since 1950. That
is, parties have generally been able to compete freely in Turkish elections. What occurs
after an election, however, is a different matter, and in the past 45 years there have been
25 closures of political parties, all occurring after general or local elections.2 In addition,
1 Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); Philippe C. Schmitter and
Terry Lynn Karl, ‘What Democracy Is … and Is Not,’ Ch. 4 in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds.,
The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univerity Press, 1996), pp. 49-62.
2 Party closures appeared to be becoming less frequent in recent years; however, the Constitutional Court’s
relatively recent (11 December 2009) decision to close the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party incited
new debates on the democratic standards in Turkey (see http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/turkey-kurds-
unrest.1y0 and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8413940.stm).
4since its transition to democracy in 1950, Turkey has experienced periodic difficulties in
the area of respect for free speech and human rights. The lengthy war in the Southeast of
the country in the 1980s and 1990s and the perception that the state was under significant
threat from the Kurdish political movement led to large-scale human rights violations and
restrictions on free speech, particularly speech on the Kurdish issue. On the positive side,
human rights violations related to problems in the southeast of the country have
decreased in recent years, and there is now more open debate about the Kurdish situation
(see, for instance, Council Decision, 18 February 2008).3
However, the adoption of Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code in 2005
introduced relatively severe restrictions on free speech, as the Article stipulates that it is
illegal (and punishable by imprisonment) for a person to publicly denigrate Turkishness,
the Turkish Republic, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the Turkish government,
the judicial institutions, or the military or security organization; amendments to this code
in 2008 have reduced the number of cases prosecuted, but the Article itself and the
possibility of punishment are both considered to be fundamental restrictions on speech
which is normally protected in a democracy, namely speech that criticises government
institutions.4 The final major problem to note regarding Turkish democracy is that since
3 Council Decision of 18 February 2008 (2008/157/EC) on the principles, priorities and conditions
contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and repealing Decision 2006/35/EC.
Available from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:051:0004:01:EN:HTML, last accessed 26
February 2010.
4 In the years since the adoption of Article 301, 261 suits were filed against 357 people in 2005. The
corresponding figures afterwards were as follows: 386 cases against 526 people in 2006 and 349 cases
against 276 people in 2007. After the amendments to the Article in 2008, opening cases under Article 301
became possible for prosecutors only after getting permission from the Minister of Justice. According to
the European Commission’s 2009 Progress Report on Turkey, the Minister of Justice permitted prosecutors
to investigate 77 cases out of a total number of 914 applications (8 percent). He then allowed investigation
of 8 applications out of 210 (3 percent). Also noted in that same EU report is that ‘the Turkish legal
framework still fails to provide sufficient guarantees for exercising freedom of expression and, as a result,
is often interpreted in a restrictive way by public prosecutors and judges’ (available at
51960 the military has been relatively actively involved in politics when compared to
established democracies, with high-ranking military officials in the modern day
continuing to periodically making public pronouncements about major issues of the day,
at times implying that force will be used to produce policy change. Moreover, the recent
events associated with the ‘Ergenekon’ organization, which is alleged to be an
ultranationalist organization with ties to the military and to have been plotting an
overthrow of the government, indicate at the very least that there is large-scale belief
within Turkey that a democratically elected government can indeed still be overthrown
by the military. In short, the periodic party closures, restrictions on freedom of speech
and military pronouncements make it clear that democracy is not fully established in
Turkey.5
In stark contrast, while some may question the quality of democracy in countries
like Spain and Greece,6 that they are fully functioning democracies is no longer in doubt.
In the case of Spain, the adoption of the Law for Political Reform in 1976, elections to
the Constituent Assembly in 1977, and the adoption of the new Spanish Constitution in
1978 were all clear steps forward in establishing democracy in Spain. The thwarting of a
military coup in February 1981 and peaceful election of a Socialist majority government
in 1982, however, perhaps serve as better indicators that by the early 1980s Spain was a
fully functioning democracy and in little real danger of reverting to authoritarian rule.
Similarly, in Greece, the adoption of the 1975 Constitution after the collapse of a 7-year
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.pdf, last accessed 1
December 2010, p. 18 of the report). We would like to thank Güçlü Akyürek from the Law Faculty of
Galatasaray University, Istanbul, for bringing this to our attention.
5 See, for instance,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf, last accessed 1
December 2010.
6 See Leonardo Morlino, Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis: parties, groups and citizens in
Southern Europe, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
6regime of colonels may be said to mark the beginning of the Greek transition to
democracy, although as discussed below, the legitimacy of the Greek Constitution was
initially in greater doubt than was the case in Spain. As in Spain, the election of a centre-
left government, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), in 1981 seemed to be a
strong indicator that Greece had established a fully functioning democracy.7
This paper seeks to explain why Turkey has failed to become a fully functioning
democracy by comparing it to the relatively more successful cases of Spain and Greece.
The authors assume that historical processes which may be difficult to capture with large-
N analyses must be explored in order to gain a better understanding of why Turkey has
not yet become a fully functioning democracy. The argument in this paper is thus based
on a small-N analysis, using the general approach of Mill’s Method of Difference, or
Przeworski and Teune’s Most Similar Systems8, whereby the dependent variable varies
across observations while the independent variables are held constant to the greatest
extent possible. In this design, the potential independent variables that do vary across
observations are amongst the likely causes of differences across the observations. Thus,
the cases of Spain and Greece have been chosen because they are similar to Turkey on a
number of key dimensions. These important similarities are outlined in the next section
and the subsequent sections highlight the key differences that we argue are likely to have
produced differences in regime type across the three countries. These differences revolve
around the inter-connected phenomena of experiences with authoritarian rule and elite
7 The election of Socialist governments was significant in both countries because of the extreme hostility
on the part of previous authoritarian governments to socialists and other leftist movements. The election of
left-wing governments in both cases without violent opposition from the right thus indicated an acceptance
that these groups had a right to compete freely in elections and to form a government if they won a majority
of seats in parliament.
8 See A. Przeworski and H. Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, (New York: Wiley-
Interscience, 1970).
7settlements or gradual elite convergence toward acceptance of the democratic rules of the
game.
Spain, Greece and Turkey: The Similarities
Economic Development. The academic literature on the relationship between economic
development and democracy is vast and because of space limitations will not be reviewed
here. However, a great deal of research indicates that democracy and economic
development are strongly connected, although the nature and direction of this relationship
is somewhat ambiguous. 9 In terms of our research design, if a group of countries is
relatively similar on this variable but still have differences on the dependent variable
(being a full democracy), then it is unlikely that this particular independent variable—
level of economic development—is the cause of the different outcomes on the dependent
variable in these cases.
Although Turkey’s level of economic development in terms of indicators such as
GDP per capita and employment in agricultural and other sectors of the economy have
been comparatively lower than those of Spain and Greece at the time of their most recent
transitions to democracy, all three countries have experienced relatively similar economic
histories. Sapelli contends, for instance, that ‘Southern Europe has specific characteristics
that are rooted in a socioeconomic structure different to that of Continental Europe
(including the British Isles), Central Europe and Eastern Europe’.10 The main
9 See, for instance, A. Przeworski et al., ‘What makes democracies endure?’, Journal of Democracy, 1996,
7(1): 39-55; and C. Boix and S.C. Stokes (2003) ‘Endogenous Democratization’, World Politics, 2003,
55(4): 517-549; Douglass C.North and Barry Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of
Institutions Governing the Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’ Journal of Economic History,
1989, 49: 803-32.
10 G. Sapelli, Southern Europe Since 1945: Tradition and modernity in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and
Turkey, (London: Longman, 1995), p. 6.
8distinguishing characteristics of the South European economies include weak, initially
foreign-dominated industrialization, rapid growth and rapid change from predominantly
agrarian societies to service-oriented economies. Thus compared to northern Europe, in
which the transition from an agrarian to a service economy was gradual via
industrialization, the transformation from agrarian to service economy in Southern
Europe was rapid and ‘has not been followed by a strong cultural change’.11 This
description of general economic development applies to all three of the case studies
analyzed here, although it must be acknowledged that parts of northern Spain did have
the type of industrialization described above. Generally, however, scholars writing on the
Spanish and Greek transitions argue that economic modernization was unlikely to be the
cause of transitions to democracy or the creation of fully functioning democracy in either
of these countries;12 for instance, Diamandouros, Puhle and Gunther note that the periods
of political transition and democratic consolidation in Greece and Spain ‘perfectly
coincided with the severe economic crises of the second half of the 1970s and early
1980s’, and yet they became fully functioning democracies.13 Scholars of Turkish history
and politics also indicate that while the breakdowns of democracy in this country may be
partly connected to economic difficulties, the primary causes of breakdowns have in fact
11 Ibid., p. 13; Salvador Giner, ‘Political Economy, Legitimation, and the State in Southern Europe’, in
Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), pp. 11-44.
12 See Richard Gunther, ‘Spain: the very model of the modern elite settlement’ in John Higley and Richard
Gunther (eds) Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge
University Press, 1992), pp. 38-80; and Neovi M. Karakatsanis, The Politics of Elite Transformation: The
Consolidation of Greek Democracy in Theoretical Perspective (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001).
13 P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, Hans-Jürgen Puhle and Richard Gunther, ‘Conclusion’, in 13 P. Nikiforos
Diamandouros, Hans-Jürgen Puhle and Richard Gunther (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation:
Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1995), p. 395.
9been political.14 In short, it seems that economic differences are unlikely to be the main
cause of differences in regime type across the three countries.
EEC/EU. Democratization researchers have also pointed to the potential importance of
international factors in explaining democratic transitions and consolidations, and some
contend that EEC/EU may be relevant in guaranteeing a stable, fully functioning
democracy.15 However, in the cases of Greece, Spain and Turkey, during their post-war
transitions to democracy, all three countries had similar affiliations with the European
Community. Greece and Turkey signed similar association agreements with the EEC in
the early 1960s, both of which envisioned full membership of the EEC; Spain also
applied for associate membership in the 1960s but was eventually granted preferential
trade status in 1970 instead.16 Although Turkey’s membership of the EU in the present
day has been called into question because of the negative views of the German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and European Council
President Herman Van Rompuy, in the 1960s and 1970s Turkey was generally seen as
being part of the ‘the west’, and there was no reason to suspect at the time that the
14 Ergun Özbudun, ‘Constitution making and democratic consolidation in Turkey’, in M. Heper, A.
Kazancigil, and B.A. Rockman (eds) Institutions and Democratic Statecraft (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1998); and Erik Jan Zürcher Turkey, A Modern History (London : I.B. Tauris, 1998).
15 See the discussion in L. Whitehead, ‘International Aspects of Democratization’, in G.A. O’Donnell, P.C.
Schmitter, and L. Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: comparative perspectives
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), and P.C. Schmitter, ‘The influence of the international
context upon the choice of national institutions and policies in neo-democracies’, in L. Whitehead (ed.) The
International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), for instance.
16 Shortly before Spain’s application for associate membership was lodged, the Birkelbach Report was
approved by the European Parliament in January 1962. The report stated that countries wishing to join the
EEC were required to recognize the principles for membership outlined by the Council of Europe:
democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. Associate status of the EEC was specified as a
future possibility for countries that fulfilled these political conditions for membership but were not
economically ready for full membership [Carlos Closa and Paul Heywood, Spain and the European Union,
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 10; J.C. MacLennan, Spain and the Process of European
Integration, 1957-85, (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2000), p. 53].
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country would not be eligible for full EC membership.17 Moreover, although both Spain
and Greece gained full entry into the European Community (Spain in 1986 and Greece in
1981), it seems unlikely that this was the main factor that made it possible for these
countries to become fully functioning, stable democracies. Spain managed to effectively
cope with an attempted military coup in February 1981, at a time when it was not at all
certain that the country would be allowed into the EC because of refusal of the French
government to accept another large predominantly agriculture-producing country into the
EC. It was only in January 1983 when discussions were held between the French and
Spanish foreign and economic ministries in parallel with negotiations for internal
Community reforms and enlargement that the French government announced that it
would help Spain with entry to the EC.18 By this time, as noted above, the Spanish
government had already (a) fought off an attempted military coup and (b) held a second
round of peaceful general elections resulting in the establishment of a Socialist Party
government. That is, Spain only gained a promise of full EC membership after it had
become a fully functioning, stable democracy.
Similarly, although Greece’s entry into the EC may have helped to turn a semi-
loyal opposition into a loyal government, it is fairly clear that this ‘semi-loyal’ opposition
was already becoming loyal long before Greece became a full EC member (Karakatsanis
2001).19 Much of the left, which was in opposition immediately after the colonels
returned government to civilians, had already begun to moderate during the regime of the
colonels, and the leader of the most significant leftist force, the Panhellenic Socialist
17 See Meltem Müftüler-Baç, Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe, (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1997).
18 MacLennon, pp. 166-74.
19 Karakatsanis.
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movement (Andreas Papandreou), began to rid his party of its radical militant activists in
the lead-up to the 1981 general election and emphasised that the party would not act as a
revolutionary movement. Contacts with West European socialist and social democratic
parties were also increased, and ‘socialism’ was eventually dropped from the party’s
discourse. Moreover, the legitimacy of the 1975 Constitution was never called into
question during the 1981 election.20 That is, Greece’s democracy appears to have been
fully functioning, with basic acceptance of the democratic rules, before the country
gained entry into the EC.
Finally, in the case of Turkey, as noted above, Turkey’s early association with the
EEC appears to have failed to help guarantee a fully functioning stable democracy there;
moreover, in the present day, although the European Commission has acknowledged that
Turkey has progressed toward meeting the EU accession criteria and several packages of
reforms and constitutional amendments have been adopted as a result of pressure from
the EU, the Commission also has continued to note the significant failings of Turkish
democracy, particularly in the realm of freedom of speech, but also in the area of the
military’s involvement in politics (see below).21 That is, despite the lengthy association
with the EEC/EC/EU and having been an official EU candidate country for more than a
decade, progress toward establishing a fully functioning democracy in Turkey has
continued to falter, perhaps indicating the limits of the EU’s influence.22
In short, Spain and Greece managed to become fully functioning democracies
before gaining full entry to the EC and without the pressure of EU conditionality. Turkey,
20 Ibid, chapters 5 and 6.
21 See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf.
22 See Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern
Europe (Ithaca, N.Y. ; London : Cornell University Press, 2005), for an analysis of the EU’s limited
influence in some candidate countries.
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despite similar associations with the EC and despite specific pressure from the EU
regarding democratisation, on the other hand, has failed to establish a fully functioning
democracy, indicating that the impact of the EC/EU may ultimately be fairly limited in
all three cases.
History of military interventions. All the three cases also share a history of military
intervention in politics. As noted above, one of the key factors keeping Turkey out of the
realm of being a fully functioning democracy is the continued involvement of the military
in Turkish politics. The first such intervention in modern Turkish politics occurred in
1960 when a group of officers staged a coup and ran the government for a short period
before returning power to civilian authorities; in 1980 a group of generals led a coup
which resulted in a longer military regime but still with a return to civilian rule in 1983.
There were also significant interventions in 1971 and 1997, with the military forcing a
change of government in both cases. Moreover, although power was officially returned to
civilians in 1961 and 1983, it is clear that the military continued to play a significant role
in determining ‘national security policy’, broadly interpreted to include most domestic
issues.23 In the modern day top military officers continue to speak on non-military issues
in public and in 2007, the Chief of General Staff explicitly threatened intervention by
stating on its website that the General Staff would 'openly display its position and
attitudes when it becomes necessary’ (27 April 2007) in response to the possibility of a
member of the popular Islamic-leaning Justice and Development Party taking control of
the Turkish presidency. In addition, the above-mentioned revelations of a possible plot
23 For the most recent official report about this, see, for instance,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf, last accessed 1
December 2010, pp. 11-12.
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for an overthrow of the Justice and Development Party government would also seem to
indicate that significant numbers of officers and co-conspirators do not yet accept the
notion of removal of the military from political life in Turkey. Moreover, despite several
reforms designed to reduce the role of the military in politics,24 the latest European
Commission report still notes that ‘on some occasions, the Chief of General Staff made
comments about ongoing court cases and investigations’,25 indicating (a) that top-level
military officials still perceive a public role for the military and (b) their comments are
still newsworthy. This implies that despite the reforms, the military is still attempting to
influence politics and is still believed to have such influence. The EU report also notes
that ‘No change has been made to the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, which
defines the duties of the military and contains an article leaving the military wide room
for manoeuvre to intervene into politics’26 and that ‘No progress has been made
concerning parliamentary oversight of the defence budget or on audit of the properties of
the armed forces by the Court of Auditors’.27 The implication is that the military still has
considerable budgetary autonomy and is thus not entirely under the control of elected
civilians.
Even before the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, though, the Ottomans
also experienced intervention by officers in the prestigious Janissary core, with the latter
often playing a role in succession decisions. Moreover, restoration of a previously
suspended constitution (suspended for 30 years by Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II) was
forced by a group of officers in 1908. That is, like Spain and Greece, Turkey has a very
24 In particular, the number of military officials sitting on the National Security Council was reduced in
2001 and use of State Security Courts was abolished in 2004, amongst many other reforms.
25 See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf, p. 11.
26 Ibid.
27 See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf, p. 12.
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lengthy history with military coups. Turkish interventions in these periods also showed
remarkable similarities to those in Spain and Greece in the 18th and 19th Centuries.28
Historically, the Greek and Spanish militaries were also heavily involved in
politics, with coups and counter-coups the norm at times in both countries. For instance,
historian Paul Preston noted that between 1814 and 1981, Spain experienced more than
50 military interventions in politics, with the most recent coup attempt occurring in 1981,
in which a group of officers attempted to overthrow the new democratic institutions.29
The most recent coup in Greece was in 1967, with the overthrow of a civilian government
being presented as an attempt by a virulently anti-communist military to prevent a
communist overthrow, although the real reasons for the coup appear to be far more
complicated than this.30 In both of these countries there was also serious concern about
continued military interventions after their transitions to democracy in the mid-1970s,
with reports and rumours of plots for coups coming to light through the early 1980s in
Greece and the 1990s in Spain.31 Despite the clear danger of military intervention in
politics in these two countries, they managed to become fully functioning democracies.32
Thus, it would appear that being prone to military interventions or having a military that
was traditionally active in politics and/or regime change in and of itself does not hinder
28 William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994); Lauren M. McLaren,
Constructing democracy in Southern Europe : a comparative analysis of Italy, Spain and Turkey (London:
Routledge, 2008), chapter 9.
29 Paul Preston, The Politics of Revenge: fascism and the military in twentieth-century Spain (London:
Routledge, 1990), p. 131.
30 Karakatsanis, chapter 2.
31 Karakatsanis; Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece (Cambridge University Press, 1979);
C.M. Woodhouse, Modern Greece: A Short History (London: Faber and Faber, 1977); Paul Heywood, The
Government and Politics of Spain, (Houndsmills: Macmillan Press, 1995); Paul Preston, The Coming of the
Spanish Civil War: reform, reaction and revolution in the Second Republic, 2nd edition, (London:
Routledge, 1978); and Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain, (London: Routledge, 1986).
32 As noted above, some may question the quality of democracy in these countries (see Morlino), but given
that it is questionable as to whether Turkey can be counted amongst the Southern European democracies in
the first place, a comparison of the quality of democracy seems inappropriate in the present analysis.
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the establishment of a fully functioning democracy—that is, regimes that have difficulties
with military interventionism are not destined to always have such problems. Somehow
the Greek and Spanish regimes managed to remove the military threat of intervention
whereas the Turkish regime still has not.
Civil war. Both Spain and Greece experienced brutal civil wars involving street fighting
between the left and the right and within leftwing groups (Spain between 1931-36 and
Greece between 1946-49). Somewhat similar developments were witnessed in Turkey in
the late 1960s. Particularly during the 1977-1980 period, however, the country came to
the verge of a civil war as the armed clashes between neo-fascist and leftist militants
were accompanied by massacres and assassinations of publicly known figures.33
In the Spanish case, civil war was eventually ended by the establishment of the
Franco regime, although violence against the left and Basques continued, particularly in
the early days of the regime. In the case of Greece, the civil war ended with the
establishment of a repressive regime that—as with Spain—targeted the left, with this
regime eventually being overthrown by a military coup in the lead-up to an election
which was predicted to produce a victory for the Center Union Party. In Turkey,
instability relating to severe political tension between the government and opposition
before 27 May 1960 and civil war conditions before 12 September 1980 were halted by
military coups. In short, all three regimes experienced large-scale political violence
between leftist and anti-leftist forces, which presumably any subsequent democratic
33 On 8 November 1978 the Prime Minister Ecevit announced that 800 people were killed as a result of
political violence, and that 1052 rightist and 778 leftist militants were arrested during his term. The
approximate death toll during Demirel’s minority government (12 November 1979 – 12 September 1980) is
thought to be around 1500 [See Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1993),
pp. 172 and 179].
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regime would eventually be required to come to terms with in establishing and stabilizing
democratic institutions.34
Thus, we contend that the factors outlined above—economic development,
relations with the EEC/EU, historical problems with military interventionism, and
political violence—are unlikely to have caused the differences in regime type in the three
countries. Instead, this paper considers two potential alternative explanations for
differences in the establishment of fully functioning democracy across the three
countries: experience with authoritarian rule and elite settlement or convergence toward
acceptance of the democratic rules of the game. We discuss each of these in turn,
highlighting the nature of authoritarian rule in the 20th Century which is likely to have (or
in the case of Turkey, have not) led to elite settlement or convergence in our three cases.
We then discuss some of the key aspects of elite settlement and convergence that are
likely to have produced differences in the functioning of democracy across the three
countries.
Difference 1: Experience with Authoritarian Rule
Although periods of extremely repressive rule do not necessarily produce the ‘right’
configuration of attitudes to guarantee stable democracy, in countries where citizens and
elites have started to engage in a democratic form of government and experience rising
expectations regarding continued democratization, periods of authoritarian rule are likely
34 We acknowledge that the Spanish Civil War was on a much larger scale than the leftwing and
fascist/right-wing violence in Greece and Turkey, but merely wish to highlight the similarities in the nature
of disputes and the existence of large-scale political violence across all three regimes. The impact of
differences in civil war conditions across the three countries may deserve further exploration in future
research, though.
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to be anachronistic. Particularly where there are civilian elites who have organized
political parties and participated in democratic rule, repression seems likely to create a
situation in which ‘the democrats’ realize cooperation amongst them will produce mutual
benefits. That is, opposition elites in such regimes are often able to unify in their deep-
seated opposition to repression, with opposition to the authoritarian regime itself serving
as a basis for cooperation. The historical memory of an authoritarian regime may also
serve to continue to ensure conciliatory behaviour and support for the basic rules of the
democratic regime. In the absence of an extremely repressive regime and the memory of
such a regime, it may be more difficult for political elites to unify to try to guarantee the
continued existence of their democracy.
The regime established by the victors of the Spanish Civil War was an extremely
repressive one, particularly at the start. Estimates vary, but clearly hundreds of thousands
were executed. Anyone who had been a member of a trade union, a Masonic lodge, any
of the republican parties or a left-wing political party, a supporter of Basque or Catalan
nationalism, or in anyway had ‘helped to undermine political order or…impeded the
Movimiento Nacional…’ was likely to be imprisoned or executed.35 Military tribunals
were often used for trials for political crimes, and in 1963 the Public Order Court was
established to deal with those suspected of ‘undermining the foundations of the state,
altering political order, or creating anxiety for the national conscience’.36 Although some
of the repression was relaxed and some liberals and Christian democrats were eventually
35 Quoted in D. Gilmour, The Transformation of Spain: from Franco to the constitutional monarchy,
(London: Quartet Books, 1985), p. 28; José María Maravall, Dictatorship and Political Dissent: Workers
and Students in Franco's Spain (London: Tavistock, 1978); Paul Preston (ed.) Spain in Crisis : The
evolution and Decline of the Franco Régime (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976); and Paul Preston, The
Politics of Revenge : Fascism and the Military in Twentieth-Century Spain (London: Routledge, 1995).
36 Gilmour, p. 29; Maravall; Preston, Spain in Crisis…; and Preston, The Politics of…
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able to publish mild criticism of the regime, the repression of communists and Basque
separatists continued during the Franco regime (Maravall 1978; Preston 1976, 1995).37 In
addition, Franco’s regime was extremely lengthy, lasting for more than thirty-five years.
It can thus be argued that the period of war and subsequent state violence against the
population and segments of the political elite had a substantial impact on the Spanish
population and its post-Franco leadership, which was likely to affect their attitudes and
behaviour during the post-Franco settlement period to be discussed below.38
The post-civil war regime in Greece, although less brutal than the war itself, was
nonetheless fairly repressive. The Greek public was officially divided into those deemed
to be ‘nationally-minded’ (noncommunists who were judged to be loyal to the regime) or
‘not nationally-minded’ (communists, family members of suspected or actual
communists, and some centrists or centre-leftists who were deemed to be ‘fellow
travellers’). The latter were ineligible for professional licences, employment in the civil
service, driver’s licences, passports, or university entrance. Martial law courts could
prosecute communists and other leftists, including those from the centre-left, as well as
those of more centrist views, and sentence them to death, and there was systematic
surveillance of hundreds of thousands of citizens. Elections were regularly held, but the
regime clearly had illiberal elements.39 A military regime was then established in 1967
which lasted until 1974. In the colonels’ regime, civil servants and school and university
teachers whose allegiance was in doubt were dismissed. Lawyers and judges who showed
too much independence were harassed and dismissed. The press was censored and
37 Maravall; Preston, Spain in Crisis…; and Preston, The Politics of…
38 See Gunther, ‘Spain: The very…’
39 Karakatsanis, pp. 30-31.
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students were subjected to brutality.40 Leaders of resistance groups were sentenced to
lengthy prison terms, and rather than targeting one part of the political spectrum, the
colonels repressed individuals from most of the political spectrum.41 The worst and most
visible act of brutality came in November 1973 when students occupied Athens
Polytechnic and university buildings in Salonika and Patras. Coup leader and post-coup
Prime Minister (and eventually President) Georgios Papadopoulos sent in troops and
tanks to crush the students; this was apparently carried out with extreme brutality and at
least 34 students and others were killed, hundreds of others were wounded and almost a
thousand arrested.42 The treatment of the students in Athens and other locations was met
with extreme revulsion, and although not on the scale of the brutality carried out in the
early Franco regime, this, along with the lengthy period of repression after the civil
war—Greece was ruled by repressive regimes for more than twenty-five years—may
have been enough to convince citizens and civilian opposition from all political leanings
that an authoritarian regime was to be avoided at all costs in the future.
Turkey was governed by the single-party regime of the Republican People’s Party
(RPP) between 1923, the year when the Republic was proclaimed, and 1946 and had no
real experience with democratic rule prior to this.43 Completely free elections were not
40 Clogg, p. 197.
41 Ibid., p. 191.
42 Prominent figures such as PASOK leader Andreas Papandreou were treated leniently, however, and
generally sent into exile (Clogg, p. 197).
43 The Ottoman Constitution of 1876 did actually foresee a parliamentary monarchy. However the only
period in the 20th century that this constitution could be said to be in effect was between 1908 and 1913.
The 1908 elections were considerably free, and the following year the constitution would be amended so as
to limit some of the Sultan’s competences (including his right to dissolve the parliament). Many parties
emerged during this period. However the political arena would soon be dominated by violence between
rival parties. A number of political homicides took place and these parties relied on different factions
within the military. The 1912 elections were rigged by the Committee of Union and Progress which would
eventually establish its single-party rule by a coup d’etat in January 1913. The regime would further
transform into a CUP dictatorship as a response to the assassination of PM Mahmud Sevket Pasha in June
1913, who was appointed to this post by the CUP next to the January coup.
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held until 1950, but because of the extremely disproportionate multi-member district
plurality system, the new opposition party—the Democrat Party (DP)—suddenly won an
overwhelming majority of seats in parliament and eventually became a repressive force in
itself and was toppled by the military in 1960. The military regime was short-lived,
however, lasting approximately one year. During this period, the toppled DP leader,
Adnan Menderes, and two of his cabinet ministers were tried and executed. On the
positive side, a new liberal constitution was designed and ratified. As noted above,
however, civil unrest re-emerged and the military stepped in again via memorandum in
1971 forcing a government resignation and warning civilian elites to solve the economic
and political crises that were bringing the country to the brink of civil war. Some heed
was paid to the memo; however, following the 1973 elections which brought back full
civilian rule, street-fighting restarted amidst bickering on the part of the political elite and
the military intervened with force in 1980. The generals who materialised the 1980 coup
were determined to restructure all the essential institutions so as to make Turkey a fairly
illiberal ‘democracy’ where freedoms of expression and association would be limited. In
Ahmad’s words, ‘all political life came to a standstill as the political parties were closed
down and former politicians banned from participating in politics. Before some
semblance of political life was restored,44 Turkey’s institutions – the constitution, the
electoral law, the universities – were radically amended so as to depoliticise the
In the Republican era, two brief multi-party periods were experienced in 1924-5 and 1930. The first
one was marked by the formation of an opposition party against the RPP, founder of the Republic, by a
group of dissident political elites of both civilian and military origins. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, however, did
not tolerate this move and the opposition party was closed in 1925. However in 1930 it was Mustafa Kemal
who encouraged the formation of an opposition party. Having attracted a large amount of support from
discontented masses, this new party would soon be regarded as a threat to the new regime and be forced to
dissolve itself.
44 This would start with the 6 November 1983 election in which only 3 parties were allowed by the military
regime to participate.
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country’.45 The coup had severe consequences: 650,000 people were taken into custody,
517 people were given the death penalty and 50 people were executed (18 leftist, 8
rightist and an Armenian militant were hanged; the others were executed for non-political
violence); 299 people died in prisons; 30,000 people fled Turkey and became political
refugees; 14,000 people already in exile were stripped of their citizenship.46 At the same
time, compared to the very lengthy experiences with repressive regimes in Spain and
Greece, this one was relatively short, lasting 38 months. Also in comparison to Spain and
Greece, the repression of elites in particular was far less widespread in Turkey: after the
1960 coup, three Democrat Party officials were executed, but there was no substantial
repression of the neo-Democrat parties; after the 1980 coup, mainstream politicians from
the centre-left Republican People’s Party and centre-right Justice Party were sent to the
military’s holiday camps for a brief period and then banned from politics for 10 years,
although this ban was removed after only five years by a referendum. One politician,
Bulent Ecevit, was imprisoned twice after giving interviews with the foreign press after
the 1980 coup and the political magazine he published was also closed down. Some
officials of the Islamist National Salvation Party also spent a few years in prison after this
coup, whereas those of the neo-fascist Nationalist Movement Party served lengthier
prison terms. Overall, though, the level of repression of elites after the 1980 coup was
relatively minimal.
This very brief overview of periods of repression in Spain, Greece and Turkey has
highlighted the variable levels of brutality experienced in the three countries. Though the
45 Feroz Ahmad, ‘Politics and political parties in Republican Turkey’ in Reşat Kasaba (ed.) The Cambridge
History of Turkey Volume 4: Turkey in the Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008),
p. 254.
46 See 12 Eylül’ün bilançosu (‘The net result of the 12 September’) at the NTV-MSNBC news portal,
http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/419690.asp (last visited on 27 October 2009).
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Turkish authoritarian regimes clearly involved tremendous brutality, the length of these
was relatively short and the extent of repression comparatively limited. The number of
executions and imprisonments compared to the Franco regime was extremely limited, and
the range of elites who were executed or imprisoned in Turkey was more limited than
either Greece or Spain. This, in turn, may have had an effect on the willingness of leaders
and the mass public to compromise to achieve a peaceful democratic regime at all costs
in order to avoid violent conflict and repression in the future. That is, Turkish elites and
ordinary citizens do not share the same widespread historical memory of brutal civil war
followed by severe government repression that the Spanish elites and citizenry share nor
do the elites themselves have a shared experience of repression as in the case of Greece,
and this is likely to have produced widely varying levels of willingness to compromise to
save democracy at all costs. Indeed, in the Turkish case, those who lived through the
most recent coup of 1980 generally express gratitude for the military’s interruption of the
civil unrest and elite bickering.47 Ironically, then, while the military may have stabilized
the regime in the short-term it created a situation in which elites and masses alike can
envision alternatives to democratic rule and these are not perceived as terrible enough to
force them into democratic compromises.
Difference 2: Elite Settlement & Convergence
Until the 1980s, many of the explanations for the establishment of stable democracy
pointed to social structural explanations, particularly the effects that changing economic
structures have on mass demands being placed on political systems as well as demands
47 The widespread popular support the 1980 coup enjoyed and the perceptive attitude of many prominent
political elites towards the military is highlighted by the work of Mehmet Ali Birand [see Mehmet Ali
Birand, 12 Eylül Saat: 04.00 (Istanbul: Karacan, 1984), pp. 245, 294 and 300-6].
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for reform of political systems.48 Scholarly research into the ‘third wave’ of democratic
transitions revisited many of these themes49 but also began more serious and systematic
consideration of agency—and particularly elite agency—in transitions and ultimately in
establishing fully functioning, stable democratic regimes.50 The early discussions of
agency distinguished between the transition phase and the smooth functioning of
democracy phase of this process, indicating that the factors that might bring democracy
into being may be very different from those that help to maintain it. Elites are crucial in
both phases, though, and it is possible that the manner in which elites handle the
transition phase may have some bearing on whether the regime becomes a fully
functioning, stable democracy or not.
In a series of publications, Field, Burton and Higley51 attempted to outline an
agency-based theory of elite settlements and convergence, which are extremely relevant
to the establishment of a fully functioning democracy. In their analysis, elites can be
conceptualized as
48 See S.M. Lipset, ‘Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy’,
American Political Science Review, 1959, 53(2), 69-105; and Barrington Moore, Social origins of
dictatorship and democracy : lord and peasant in the making of the modern world (Harmondsworth : Allen
Lane The Penguin Press, 1967).
49 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); D.
Rueschemeyer, E.H. Stephens, and J.D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1992).
50 For instance, see the four-volume Transitions From Authoritarian Rule series edited by O’Donnell et al.
(1986), Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (1996), and
The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (1995) edited by
Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, to name a few.
51 E.g., G. Lowell Field and John Higley, Elites and Non-Elites: The Possibilities and their Side Effects.
(Andover, MA: Warner Modular Publications, 1973); Michael G Burton and John Higley, ‘Elite
Settlements’. American Sociological Review, 1987, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jun., 1987), pp. 295-307; John Higley
and Michael G. Burton, ‘The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns’ American
Sociological Review, 1989, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 17-32; John Higley and Gwen Moore, ‘Elite Integration in
the United States and Australia’ American Political Science Review, 1981, 75:581-97; and John Higley and
Michael Burton, ‘Elite Settlements and the Taming of Politics’, Government and Opposition, 1998, Vol. 33
pp.98 – 115.
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people who are able, through their positions in powerful organizations, to
affect national political outcomes individually, regularly, and seriously…a
nation’s top leadership in all sectors—political, governmental, business, trade
union, military, media, religious, and intellectual—including both
‘establishment’ and ‘counterelite’ factions. A national elite can be said to
encompass ‘all those persons capable if they wish, of making substantial
political trouble for high officials (i.e., other elite persons who happen to be
incumbents of authoritative positions) without being promptly repressed.52
According to this body of research, an important distinction between types of elites can
be drawn between those who are disunified and those who are consensually unified. In
the former, elite factions are deeply distrustful of one another, interpersonal relations
amongst elites do not cross factional lines, and factions do not generally cooperate to
contain societal divisions or avoid political crises. Consensually unified elites (in pluralist
political systems, that is) may take opposing ideological or policy stances but they
consistently refrain from pushing their disagreements to the point of violent conflict;
elites share a tacit commitment to abide by common codes of political conduct centring
on a norm of restrained partisanship, and there is an extensive web of interpersonal
relationships across factional lines.53 The former of these elite structures is generally
believed to be associated with political instability, including frequent or expected forcible
seizures of government power; the latter is believed to be associated with peaceful
democratic rule, and thus it is clear that without a transition to this type of elite—
52Field and Higley, p. 8.
53 Burton and Higley, p. 296; see also Higley and Moore in general.
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according to the elite settlement and convergence arguments—establishing a fully
functioning stable democracy is not possible.54
Elites can become unified fairly suddenly via an elite settlement, usually at the
end of a period of costly but inconclusive conflict such as a civil war in which no party
emerges as the clear winner, or as a result of a major crisis of the state, often revolving
around the failures of the head of state (e.g. monarch).55 Alternatively, elites may
gradually converge towards acceptance of the democratic rules, often after some of the
warring groups of elites enter sustained, peaceful collaboration in electoral politics and
manage to dominate government executive power by winning elections; other groups of
elites who may have initially been hostile to this new set-up eventually realize that the
only way to gain power is to abandon the ideological and policy stances that keep them
from winning elections and adopt those of the winning coalition.56 In the process,
previously anti-system, or semi-loyal, elites are converted into system loyalists, willing to
play the game according the rules set by their opponents.57 Thus, elite settlements occur
when political leaders enter into secret agreements with each other regarding the
democratic rules of the game. On the other hand, the two-step process of elite
convergence eventually leads to the creation of a fully functioning democracy despite the
absence of private face-to-face negotiations.
The degree of elite unity varies substantially across our three cases. Spain
represents a now-classic sudden elite settlement model, Greece represents a case of elite
54 Burton and Higley, pp. 296-7; but see Paul Cammack, ‘A Critical Assessment of the New Elite
Paradigm’.American Sociological Review, 1990, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Jun.,), pp. 415-420 for a critique of these
arguments.
55 Burton and Higley, p. 298.
56 Higley and Burton, p. 22.
57 We acknowledge the explanatory limitations of the elite settlement approach but contend here that it
provides extremely useful analytical (if somewhat descriptive) tools for understanding the failure of Turkey
to become a fully functioning democracy.
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convergence, while Turkey represents a case of elite disunity, particularly lack of
settlement and lack of gradual convergence. Given the potential importance of this
variable in explaining the differences in regime type across the three cases, it is worth
exploring further how and why the three countries differ on this variable.
The events surrounding the elite settlement in Spain have been outlined by other
scholars,58 but a few of the key points deserve to be revisited here, given their stark
contrast with events in Greece and Turkey. In Spain, previously warring factions from the
1931-36 republican period and subsequent civil war were initially stopped by the Franco
regime, and his death opened up the possibility of a more permanent settlement across
these groups. Such a settlement was far from inevitable, however, and several alternative
approaches after Franco’s death were possible. King Juan Carlos and the elite he put in
charge of the transition, Adolfo Suárez, however, appeared to realize that the best hope
for permanent peace and stability was a settlement, with any alternative perceived as
likely to produce significant elite and civil unrest and perhaps a return to the levels of
violence experienced during the civil war. Suárez also seemed to realize that the best
hope for settlement would be via private discussions with elites who had the potential to
disrupt the transition and to cause serious problems of governance if not included. This
approach began prior to any official discussion of a constitutional settlement, and focused
on discussions with the major opposition, who had already begun to make demands for
the legalization of all parties and had begun to form a provisional government (and had
also organized public demonstrations and strikes).59 Early on, Suárez began negotiating
with these elites and also with representatives of the right prior to drafting the Law for
58 See, for instance Gunther (1992).
59 Gunther 1992, pp. 47-48; Preston 1986.
27
Political Reform, which paved the way for the creation of an elected constituent assembly
to draft a new constitution. After the approval of the Political Reform Law, contacts
between Suárez and the opposition were formalized with the creation of a nine-member
negotiating committee which aimed to represent the main groups in the opposition.60 The
drafting of the crucial electoral law which would determine the composition of the
constituent assembly reflected the discussions Suárez was conducting with the committee
of the nine on the one hand and the Franquist right on the other. The law incorporated the
wishes of the Socialists and Communists for proportional representation but also included
‘correctives’ to over-represent the two largest parties in most districts, correctives which
had been promised to the right, which was concerned with potential fragmentation of
Spanish politics. This system proved successful in preventing fragmentation while
simultaneously not excluding important groups.61 The system of informal negotiation
continued with the development of the Pacts of Moncloa, which aimed to stabilize labour
relations during an increasingly precarious economic situation while the parties continued
to develop the constitution.
The formal constitutional drafting phase of the process began with the
appointment of a seven-man ponencia (drafting subcommittee). The party newly formed
by Suárez, the Union of the Democratic Centre, had won the plurality of seats in the
constituent assembly and had three representatives in the ponencia; the Socialists,
Communists, the Catalan nationalist Convergencia democratica de Catalunya, and the
party formed to represent the Franquist right, the Alianza Popular, each had one
60 This included the Socialists, Social Democrats, Communists, Liberals, Christian Democrats, the three
largest trade unions, and moderate Basque, Gallego, and Catalán groups (Gunther 1992, pp. 49-50; Preston
1986).
61 Gunther ‘Spain: the very...’, p. 51; Preston, The Triumph of...
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representative (importantly, the subcommittee contained no representative of the
Basques). Deliberations were entirely confidential. However, once a draft of the
constitution became public and interest groups and other political parties were invited to
participate by offering amendments, a more conflictual pattern of decision-making
emerged, with the Socialist representative walking out of talks when an amendment on
church-state relations was introduced by the right. Initial discussions of the draft of the
constitution in the Congress of Deputies took place publicly and decisions were taken
using relatively close votes and majoritarian principles. The UCD and AP between them
had enough votes to push provisions through and could have easily imposed a new
constitutional order on the remaining parties; however, it soon became clear that enacting
a constitution that excluded the support of the regionalist or leftist parties would produce
severe limitations on the legitimacy of the new regime. Thus, a new decision-making
style was introduced in which four deputies from the two largest (and opposing) parties—
the UCD and Socialists—met at a restaurant to attempt to resolve outstanding
differences. By the following morning they had reached compromise agreements on all
the major contentious religious issues (disestablishment, education, divorce, abortion),
labour relations, and other contentious issues. Subsequently, differences across groups
were dealt with in a similar manner. Parliamentary debates that had previously been
lengthy and rancorous suddenly became brief.62
Gunther highlights the importance of face-to-face contacts between Prime
Minister (or, officially, President of the Government of Spain) Suárez and opposition
leaders and particularly the cordial relations that developed between Suárez and
Communist Party leader Santiago Carrillo and Socialist leader Felipe González, both of
62 Gunther ‘Spain: the very...’, pp. 59-60; Preston The Triumph of..., p. 60.
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whom had been considered to be enemies of the regime only a few years before this.
These friendly relations continued across party lines in negotiations over the constitution
and the regional autonomy statutes as well.63 The only issue that could not be dealt with
completely in this way was the issue of the Basques, although agreements were
eventually developed and most of the Basque political factions have pledged loyalty to
the Spanish constitution and renounced armed conflict.
The process by which elites were transformed from disunity to consensual unity
in Greece is in contrast to the Spanish process. Given the violence of the Greek civil war,
the subsequent distinction drawn between ‘nationally minded’ versus ‘suspect’ citizens
(anti-communist versus communist), and the severe repression of the left carried out by
the right-wing government after the civil war via ‘loyalty boards’ and martial law courts,
it would be expected that some sort of reconciliation would be required before Greece
could establish a fully functioning, stable democracy. During the rule of the colonels
several attempts at developing an anti-dictatorship unity were, in fact, attempted but these
generally failed due to personal animosities and suspicion between the left and right,64
thus making the possibility of a negotiated transition like Spain’s unlikely.65
The 1974 transition to democracy in Greece was extremely abrupt, was dominated
by a single partisan individual—Constantine Karamanlis—and in contrast to Suárez’s
approach in Spain, this transition leader did not attempt any formal or informal
negotiations between elites. Even the decision regarding who would lead the transition to
63 Gunther ‘Spain: the very...’, p. 54.
64 Karakatsanis, pp. 47-51.
65 It is contended, however, that although these talks failed to produce a unified solution to rule of the
colonels, the face-to-face contacts between previously warring elites served to create a sense of unity and
mutual civility between them, and these helped to build mutual trust and respect between civilian
politicians (Karakatsanis, pp. 7-8).
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democracy—initially reached via discussions amongst elites—was ultimately made in a
less-than-negotiated manner that had the potential to provoke suspicion and hostility.
That is, once the military decided to hand power back to civilians (after being
embarrassed by failed mobilization efforts against Turkey), the civilian leadership from
the right and centre-right and several military officers decided that the leader of the
National Radical Union (Kanellopoulos) should lead the transitional coalition
government. The new government was due to be sworn in three hours after this decision
was made but during this short period, the agreement was broken by a smaller group of
the negotiators who decided—without informing the others—that Karamanlis should be
invited to lead the transition government.66
Once he was sworn in, Karamanlis single-handedly chose the members of his
1974 national unity government, which included none of the main left-wing parties or
politicians, although a handful of prominent politicians who had been persecuted during
the military dictatorship were included. Karamanlis also personally decided the timing of
the first post-junta elections and a referendum on the monarchy, unilaterally legalized the
Communist Party of Greece, lifted all the restrictive post-civil war measures, and
commuted the junta leaders’ death sentences to life imprisonment, all without negotiation
with elites from the left, right, or from the military. In the elections held prior to the
drafting of a new constitution, the electoral law used for these included a strongly
majoritarian electoral formula of ‘reinforced’ proportional representation, and
Karamanlis’s New Democracy Party won 73.3 per cent of the parliamentary seats with
66 Karakatsanis, p. 57; Clogg.
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only 54 per cent of the popular vote.67 Thus, the ‘constituent assembly’ itself clearly
failed to accurately represent the socio-political divisions in Greek society. In fact, the so-
called constituent assembly did not perform the function that would normally be expected
of such a body. Again, in contrast to the ponencia created to draft the Spanish
constitution, in Greece Karamanlis and a handful of close advisors drafted the
constitution themselves and submitted it to parliament for debate. The constitution was
considered by two special parliamentary committees whose composition represented the
relative strength of various parties in parliament, thereby ensuring a majority for
Karamanlis’s New Democracy Party on both. The opposition fervently objected that most
of its amendments had been rejected and walked out of debate, refusing to attend most of
the subsequent sessions. They also boycotted the signing ceremony on 9 June 1975.
Moreover, the members of the constituent assembly who remained for the entirety of the
debate did not have time to finish discussing all of the articles of the constitution because
Karamanlis had stipulated that debate would be limited to three months and refused to
negotiate this stipulation.68 The difference between this process and the careful cross-
party negotiations in Spain could hardly be starker.
Not surprisingly, the main opposition party leader in Greece, Andreas Papandreou
(PASOK), denounced the constitution, arguing that many of its provisions—particularly
those regarding executive power—were ‘totalitarian’. He also initially claimed that if his
party were to win enough seats to form a government in future elections, he would
dissolve parliament and hold elections for a new constituent assembly to write a new
67 Juan Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and Post-Communist Europe, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p.
113; Woodhouse, p. 306.
68 Karakatsanis, pp. 9-10 and 58-9; Clogg.
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constitution. Prominent politician George Mavros, leader of the Centre Union, also
initially denounced the constitution, as did the Communists.69 Thus, in 1974 PASOK
appeared to be a semi loyal party which threatened the new Greek democratic regime,
while several other parties were also questioning the legitimacy of the new regime.
Karakatsanis contends that Karamanlis’s domination of the transition may, in fact,
have helped contribute to establishing democratic stability in Greece because Karamanlis
was acceptable to virtually all Greeks by 1974 and he attempted to act as a national rather
than partisan leader. Although Karamanlis’s National Radical Union party (predecessor
to New Democracy) had been responsible for many of the repressive measures taken in
the post-civil-war era, his approach had clearly changed by the time he returned from his
self-imposed exile in Paris to lead the transition, and he made vast reforms to the Greek
right. His legalization of the Greek Communist Party of the Interior, adoption of civil and
human rights provisions, as well as social welfare and gender equality provisions are all
evidence of his moderation. Furthermore, after the fall of the colonels, there was
widespread diffuse support for democracy and virtually any democratic alternative was
perceived as acceptable. It was perceived that Karamanlis had the authority and prestige
to lead this process. Even prominent leftists spoke of him approvingly.70
Also important in the Greek transition is that the apparent semi-loyal rhetoric of
PASOK was ultimately not met with action. Once PASOK took control of government in
1981 it carried out very few of the actions it had promised and Papandreou had, in fact,
already begun to distance himself from the more extreme elements in the party in the run-
69 Karakatsanis, pp. 9-10 and 60. Importantly, though, one of the primary constitutional issues that had
caused serious dispute and protests—the Greek monarchy—was left to the people to decide. A referendum
was held in December 1974 in which 69 per cent of Greek voters voted against restoration of the monarchy
(Clogg, p. 207).
70 Karakatsanis, pp. 72-3 and 75-6.
33
up to the election, as noted above. Thus, the main party of the left had begun to moderate.
In addition, although the Communists—also a relatively popular movement in Greece—
opposed the electoral system imposed on them and opposed many aspects of the new
constitution, the party still pledged in 1974 to adhere to democratic, parliamentary
government.71 Thus, by 1981, there was widespread acceptance of the democratic rules
established by Karamanlis, both on the part of the public and on the part of elites.
Karakatsanis points out that the Greek case indicates that radical anti-constitution
rhetoric does not necessarily translate into semi- or disloyal behaviour (Karakatsanis, pp.
131-32). Such rhetoric can be used mostly to attempt to win votes and/or because it is
perceived that this is simply the way that the opposition should behave; Andreas
Papandreou’s failure to change the constitution and his gradual dropping of language
signifying that he would do so indicates that gradual convergence may indeed occur.
Thus, Greece appears to represent a two-step model of elite convergence: Karamanlis and
New Democracy managed to dominate the transition and early period of Greek
democracy and while the main opposition, PASOK, initially appeared to oppose the
institutions of this new democracy, it seemed to realize that it would have to moderate in
order to avoid the position of being a permanent loser in the new regime. This
convergence, in turn, provided a degree of stability to Greek institutions that would likely
ward off attempts at overthrow—although as noted above, there were still rumours of
such plots. The fact that these did not come to fruition may thus be a strong indicator of
the widespread acceptance and legitimacy of Greek democratic institutions, which would
make an overthrow extremely difficult indeed.
71 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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Karakatsanis’s analysis also indicates that for this particular method of achieving
elite consensual unity via gradual convergence to succeed, (a) the person or group leading
the transition must have widespread legitimacy and (b) democracy must be seen by elites
and the masses as the only option available (whether due to international circumstances,
memory of brutality, experience with a poorly functioning authoritarian regime etc.).
The case of Turkey represents neither one of elite settlement prior to the launch
of a new democratic regime nor gradual convergence. Instead, the Turkish case appears
to be marked by elite disunity, as defined above. After the 1960 military coup in Turkey,
a new constitution which was more liberal than the previous one was drafted by a
Constitutive Assembly and ratified by public vote. The way that assembly came into
existence and debates surrounding the new constitution were democratic to some extent.
However the constitution-making process in 1961 had a crucial deficiency too: members
and supporters of the Democrat Party (DP), the former governing party which was
overthrown by the junta that carried out the coup, were excluded from the entire
process.72 Apart from raising questions of legitimacy for the new Constitution (and even
for the new political order) of post-1960 Turkey, that exclusion would also result in a
reluctance in neo-Democrat parties to defend the constitutional order in times of difficult
political crises entailing the military’s involvement in politics.73 It is important to note
also that in contrast to the Greek 1975 Constitution, the 1961 Constitution in Turkey was
not designed by an individual or group that had widespread popularity or legitimacy. The
constitution-writing process in Greece was far from consensual but the fact that it was
designed by an elite who was elected with widespread popular support in an election in
72 See Bülent Tanör and Necmi Yüzbaşıoğlu, 1982 Anayasasına Göre Türk Anayasa Hukuku, (Istanbul:
Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001), pp. 36-8.  
73McLaren, chapters 5 & 11.
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which other major (and minor) parties were also allowed to compete freely would seem
to lend far more legitimacy to the rules and procedures designed by Karamanlis and his
advisers than was the case with the 1961 Turkish constitution.
The making of the post-coup 1982 Turkish constitution was even less democratic
than the 1961 Constitution’s design process. In the latter case, most of the members of
the Constitutive Assembly were elected – though not with direct elections or universal
suffrage.74 In addition, in cases of discord between the civilian (‘Representatives’
Assembly’) and military (‘Committee of National Union’) branches of the Constitutive
Assembly, a mixed commission consisting of members from both branches, or the
civilian branch per se, was prescribed to prevail.75 However during the 1982 constitution-
making process, the military branch (‘Council of National Security’) of the Constitutive
Assembly had an undisputed supremacy over the civilian branch (‘Consultative
Assembly’). All members of the Consultative Assembly were appointed by the military,
and none of them were members of any party. Indeed all political parties and party
members from the pre-coup period were excluded from participating in this process and
banned from politics for several years after the coup. The final draft of the 1982
Constitution would be introduced to popular vote for ratification, however criticising it
was forbidden.76
Tanör and Yüzbaşıoğlu contend that democratic constitution-making principles 
comprise free public opinion, freedom for political parties, elected assemblies and
democratic representation, and free elections, and these authors posit that the Spanish and
74 Bülent Tanör, Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001), pp. 369-70. 
75 Tanör and Yüzbaşıoğlu, p. 37; Tanör, p. 370.   
76 Tanör and Yüzbaşıoğlu, pp. 29 and 34-7; Ergun Özbudun, ‘Constitution making and democratic 
consolidation in Turkey’, in M. Heper, A. Kazancigil, and B.A. Rockman (eds) Institutions and
Democratic Statecraft, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
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Greek democratic transitions in the 1970s were in conformity with democratic principles.
However, in their view, the methods practiced in Turkey after the 1980 military coup fell
short of the these principles and are therefore closer to the constitution-making models
experienced in Pakistan, Albania, and some Latin American countries. In this respect,
they stress that the high level of the ‘yes’ votes at the 1982 referendum on the Turkish
constitution does not necessarily imply the presence of a strong, voluntary and conscious
social approval behind the Turkish Constitution.77
Thus, the Turkish case follows neither the Spanish nor Greek models. Elites have
neither had the opportunity to develop a lasting cross-party settlement nor have they
gradually converged toward acceptance of any particular regime rules designed by a
popular, elected government. In contrast, in the Greek case of gradual convergence, the
constitution was designed by a very popular leader who had been elected by the Greek
public, with no limitations imposed on opposition participation in these elections. While
the Constitution was not designed in a consensual manner, it was at least designed by a
leader whose party had clear public support. In Turkey, both the 1961 and 1982
Constitutions were designed by groups of elites who did not necessarily have public
support, as the public was not directly consulted except to ratify the documents produced
by the assemblies. Thus it has been possible for almost all elites to question the
settlements, and in the instance of the 1982 settlement, the document produced was far
from democratic in any case.78 The lack of settlement or elite convergence toward a set of
democratic rules has implications for political stability and particularly the role of the
77 Tanör and Yüzbaşıoğlu, pp. 37-8.  
78 Elite settlement may, of course, not guarantee democracy and instead could produce an authoritarian
settlement. However, given the configuration of interests in Turkey, this sort of settlement seems extremely
unlikely. Thus it appears that any movement toward elite unity in acceptance of the basic rules of the
regime will revolve around democratic rules rather than authoritarian rules.
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military in guaranteeing stability. Even in the face of political and economic turbulence in
Spain during the transition to democracy, elite settlement regarding the democratic
rules—made possible via consensual negotiations—also allowed elites to converge to
fight off the military threat in the early 1980s and beyond. The gradual convergence
experienced in Greece appears to have had a similar effect. In Turkey, on the other hand,
the failure to develop an elite settlement on key issues—including the functioning of
Turkish democratic institutions, the very controversial issue of the role of religion and
rights of religious groups, and the treatment of ethnic minority groups—has meant elite
disagreement on the basic rules of the regime and unwillingness to defend democratic
rules (particularly since they played no role in creating them in the first place). This, in
turn, has meant that civilian elites have been less willing or able to amass the power
required to counter the military threat. They have also had more difficulty in converging
toward a general acceptance of the meaning of—and acceptable limitations on—free
speech, which has significant implications for respect for the latter in Turkey.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that experience with authoritarian rule and elite settlement or
convergence are likely to be key explanations for the differences in regime type between
Spain and Greece, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other. The former two countries
experienced violent civil wars followed by years of repression, experiences which are
likely to have had a significant impact on the historical memory of elites and masses,
making them more prone to try to avoid repeating these circumstances. In this respect, it
should be acknowledged that the Civil War in Spain may be just as important as the
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Franco dictatorship in determining the behaviour of Spanish elites. Turkey has also
experienced conditions approaching civil war but these experiences were generally halted
by military interventions involving relatively limited brutality and repression. The elites
and ‘ordinary’ cadres of the mainstream political parties in Turkey were rarely harmed in
times of military intervention, whereas elites of all political persuasions were repressed in
Greece’s most recent experience with authoritarian rule (the regime of the colonels).
Thus, in Spain and Greece, when democracy has failed, the consequences have been quite
severe (especially so in Spain); in Turkey, when democracy has failed, the military has
served as a welcome stabilizer. This outcome is positive in the sense that the level of
human suffering is likely to have been reduced in Turkey; however, it may be one of the
factors that has made it unnecessary for elites to attempt to settle their differences to try
to make democracy work.
As noted above, one of the key failures in terms of elite settlement or convergence
in Turkey is the failure to come to some agreement regarding the place of religion in
Turkish politics and society. This potentially makes Turkey's situation more difficult than
was the case with Spain, where by 1975 the church had distanced itself from the Franco
regime and was fairly accommodating to the democratizers. In Turkey, circumstances
were and are quite different. First of all, there is no ‘the mosque’ in Turkey similar to ‘the
church’ in Spain since secularism in Turkey came into being as the state's establishment
of control and domination over the religion. When it comes to political Islam, the Islamist
party was quite strong even in 1970s and Islamists gradually accumulated power during
1980s, but it was not until the mid-1990s that the Islamist/secularist cleavage would
become important. Since that juncture, the scale of tension between Islamists (or religious
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conservatives) and secularists has likely been far greater than was the tension between
liberals and conservative Catholics in Spain during its transition (but perhaps similar to
the situation in 1930s Spain). This cleavage may reduce the likelihood of a consensual
democracy in Turkey. As noted above, however, one reason for this modern-day tension
in Turkey is likely to be the failure of elites to even attempt to consensually settle among
themselves what role religion would play in the Turkish polity. This failure dates back to
the establishment of the 1924 Constitution and has continued to be repeated in later
constitutional arrangements, as well as other junctures along the way, and continues to
provide one of the justifications for limitations of freedom and acceptance of the military
presence in Turkish politics. It is fairly clear that gradual convergence on the role of
religion in a fully functioning Turkish democracy is unlikely, and so it appears that the
only other alternative to the current situation is elite settlement on this issue.
Similarly, the Kurdish question continues to stand out as a factor which has made
full democracy difficult to achieve in Turkey. Spain had to deal with a comparable
problem, the Basque question, both before and after its transition to democracy (and
particularly increased Basque violence around the time of the transition). This may be
roughly comparable to Turkey’s Kurdish problem. However two crucial differences
between the two cases remain: the Basque Country is more developed than much of the
rest of Spain whereas the Kurdish populated parts of Turkey are the poorest regions of
the country. Second, ETA’s insurgency caused the death of less than a thousand people in
Spain while it is estimated that more than 30,000 people lost their lives in Turkey due to
the PKK’s rebellion. The impacts of these differences on democracy are clearly worth
exploration in future research.
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Nevertheless, we contend that our findings still have clear implications for
ongoing attempts to establish stable democracy in Turkey. Although the EU is attempting
to use ‘carrots and sticks’ to pull and push Turkey toward democracy, its success has thus
far has been fairly limited. Our findings indicate that the EU’s approach may not be that
helpful because of the failure of any real elite settlement or convergence toward
acceptance of any particular set of democratic rules. Until such settlement or convergence
occurs, it seems unlikely that Turkey will move significantly forward in meeting the EU’s
political requirements for full membership.
Since the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) -a party with
religious background- in 2002, the party leadership has periodically raised the issue of
developing a new, civilian-designed constitution. Based on the advice of constitutional
scholar Ergun Özbudun, the government initially appeared to hope to adopt a Spanish-
style consensual approach to constitutional design. This issue was dropped from the
agenda as a result of the main opposition Republican People’s Party’s firm resistance to
any attempt of constitutional reform led by the AKP, highlighting the increased
importance of the above-mentioned Islamist/secularist cleavage. Attempts to conduct a
broad constitutional reform to democratize the Turkish polity are likely to crop up again,
however. As argued in this paper, lack of such reform may create a serious stumbling
block on Turkey’s road to finally creating a fully functioning democracy. Thus, it seems
that, as argued by Grigoriadis,79 some consensus between the conservative Islamists and
the secularists must be achieved to resolve social divisions in Turkey and ultimately to
develop a fully functioning democracy in Turkey.
79 I. Grigoriadis, ‘Islam and Democratization in Turkey: Secularism and Trust in a Divided Society’.
Democratization, 2009, 16(6): 1194-1213.
